



# Big Sky Debate Update

"Maybe where there's clarity of air, there's clarity of thought"—Chet Huntley

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Welcome to our next to last issue for the 2005 season. Our last issue will come out the Saturday before the NFL tournament, so be sure to get requests in early for that double issue.

Thanks,  
Pogie

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## THURSDAY FILE ANSWERS: PORTMAN POLITICAL CAPITAL SCENARIO

PORTMAN WILL BE CONFIRMED FRIDAY; REPUBLICANS HAVE ENOUGH VOTES TO OVERCOME BAYH'S OBJECTIONS WITHOUT USE OF BUSH POLITICAL CAPITAL--Collins '04

[Michael; "Portman might be confirmed on Friday; The Cincinnati Post; 28 April 05; <http://news.cincypost.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050428/NEWS01/504280358>; downloaded 28 April 05]

Congressman Rob Portman could be confirmed as early as Friday as the new U.S. trade representative.

Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, R-Tenn., filed a motion Wednesday to proceed with a vote on Portman's nomination even though it had been put on hold by Sen. Evan Bayh, D-Ind.

Bayh had said he would not allow a vote on the nomination until the Senate scheduled a vote on one of his stalled bills. The legislation would let the United States fully enforce its anti-subsidy laws against countries such as China.

Republicans, however, want to see Portman confirmed in time for him to attend an informal meeting of the World Trade Organization ministers next Tuesday in Paris.

The "cloture" motion filed by Frist would allow a vote on the nomination if at least 60 senators agree.

Frist spokeswoman Amy Call said a vote will be held on Friday, and the majority leader is confident he has the votes to proceed.

"Portman needs to be confirmed quickly, and he has bipartisan support," Call said.

PORTMAN WAS SUPPORTED BY THE FULL SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE-- Collins '04

[Michael; "Portman might be confirmed on Friday; The Cincinnati Post; 28 April 05; <http://news.cincypost.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20050428/NEWS01/504280358>; downloaded 28 April 05]

Portman, a Terrace Park Republican, was nominated for the trade representative's job in March by President Bush.

The Senate Finance Committee unanimously endorsed his nomination on Tuesday.

Portman has represented Ohio's 2nd Congressional District for 12 years. He plans to resign from Congress once he is confirmed as trade representative. A special election will be held to fill his congressional seat.

BAYH ONLY SEEKING A VOTE; NO GUARANTEE OF PROTECTIONIST MEASURE PASSAGE-- Welsch '05

[Edward; "Bayh wants China to stop subsidizing private firms; Senator wants to block Portman's nomination as trade rep in exchange for antissubsidy law;" The Times Online; 13 April 05; <http://www.thetimesonline.com/articles/2005/04/13/business/business/f79bfb35c272c02d86256fe100782965.txt>; downloaded 28 April 05]

Sen. Evan Bayh, D-Ind., announced his intention Tuesday to block President Bush's nominee for U.S. trade representative, Rep. Rob Portman of Ohio, until the Senate Republican leadership allows a vote on Bayh's bill to stop China from subsidizing its private industries.

BAYH BILL HAS NO SUPPORTERS AMONG REPUBLICANS IN THE SENATE, WILL NOT PASS-- Welsch '05

[Edward; "Bayh wants China to stop subsidizing private firms; Senator wants to block Portman's nomination as trade rep in exchange for antisubsidy law;" The Times Online; 13 April 05;

<http://www.thetimesonline.com/articles/2005/04/13/business/business/f79bfb35c272c02d86256fe100782965.txt>; downloaded 28 April 05]

"This is not personal to Congressman Portman," Bayh said. "He should be confirmed, and we should get a vote."

Bayh co-authored the bipartisan proposal with Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine. It has 18 co-sponsors.

Bayh tried to get an identical bill passed last session, but it died in committee. He said that he tried during both the last session and the current one to pass the bill by attaching it to other bills coming up for votes but did not get any support from the Senate's Republican leaders.

"Frankly, (we) haven't been able to get the attention of the powers that be," Bayh said. "Around here to demonstrate seriousness you have to show that you can take a stand, and that's what I'm doing."

BUSH NEED NOT SPEND CAPITAL; CAN APPOINT PORTMAN AT NEXT CONGRESSIONAL RECESS-- Groppe '05

[Maureen; "Sen. Bayh blocking trade job nominee; Indiana Democrat wants to force vote on measure to help U.S. compete with China;" Indianapolis Star; 13 April 05;

<http://www2.indystar.com/articles/8/236475-8218-010.html>; downloaded 28 April 05]

Senate Democrats have threatened to block the confirmations of Bush's nominees to head the Environmental Protection Agency and the Food and Drug Administration.

If Bayh's objection continues, the administration can appoint Portman during the next congressional recess. The appointment would only last, however, through the end of Congress' next session.

## PLANET DEBATE POLITICS DISAD ANSWERS: NO CAFTA VOTE SCHEDULED

NO DATE SET FOR A CAFTA VOTE--Barclay '05

[Eliza; "CAFTA draws wide opposition;" World Peace Herald; 28 April 05;

<http://www.wpherald.com/storyview.php?StoryID=20050428-045757-1117r>;

downloaded 29 April 05]

Under CAFTA, Central American countries would immediately avoid paying tariffs on 80 percent of the U.S. exports of consumer and industrial goods. The remaining tariffs would be phased out over 10 years, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative says.

U.S. trade officials finalized the deal in 2003, but it still needs congressional approval. No date has been set on a vote.

DESPITE HEARINGS, NO CAFTA VOTE IS SCHEDULED-- Chang '05

[I-Wei J. Chang; "Businesses see benefits in CAFTA;" The Business Gazette; 29 April 05;

<http://www.gazette.net/200517/business/news/272665-1.html>; downloaded 28 April

05]

The agreement was finalized by U.S. trade officials in December 2003, but has not been approved by Congress. Senate and House committees held hearings in recent weeks, but a spokeswoman for Senate Finance Committee Chairman Charles Grassley (R) of Iowa said last week no date for committee action has been set.

## PLANET DEBATE POLITICS ANSWERS: CAFTA WILL HAVE NO EFFECT

CAN'T COMPARE CAFTA WITH NAFTA SINCE CAFTA ECONOMIES ARE SMALLER-- Chang '05

[I-Wei J. Chang; "Businesses see benefits in CAFTA;" The Business Gazette; 29 April 05; <http://www.gazette.net/200517/business/news/272665-1.html>; downloaded 28 April 05]

But CAFTA will not have the impact here that NAFTA did, simply because trade with the CAFTA nations is relatively small, said I.M. "Mac" Destler, a trade expert at the University of Maryland's School of Public Policy.

The Department of Commerce said Maryland exports to the region reached \$37 million in 2004, up \$13 million -- or 57 percent -- from 2000.

CAFTA WILL HAVE LITTLE IMPACT POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE ON THE UNITED STATES-- Ünlüby '05

[Orçun; "State businesses lobby for CAFTA;" The Chronicle; 25 April 2005; <http://www.chronicle.duke.edu/vnews/display.v/ART/2005/04/25/426cca059c356>; downloaded 28 April 05]

Associate Professor of Public Policy Studies and Political Science Frederick Mayer, who specializes in trade agreements, said he tends to support CAFTA.

"It is unlikely that it is going to have positive or negative effects," he said. "It will have a bigger impact on Central America than on the U.S. economy."

CAFTA BETTER THAN NAFTA-- Ünlüby '05

[Orçun; "State businesses lobby for CAFTA;" The Chronicle; 25 April 2005; <http://www.chronicle.duke.edu/vnews/display.v/ART/2005/04/25/426cca059c356>; downloaded 28 April 05]

Ballenger argued that CAFTA is a stronger agreement than NAFTA, which opened up trade between the U.S., Canada and Mexico. CAFTA would eliminate one-sided tariffs paid by U.S. companies pushing to do business in Central America—something NAFTA's regulations do not allow.

## PLANET DEBATE POLITICS DISAD ANSWERS: CAFTA WON'T PASS

REPUBLICANS BACKING AWAY FROM CAFTA-- Barclay '05

[Eliza; "CAFTA draws wide opposition;" World Peace Herald; 28 April 05; <http://www.wpherald.com/storyview.php?StoryID=20050428-045757-1117r>; downloaded 29 April 05]

Congressional Republicans who traditionally have supported free trade have found themselves pinched by constituents concerned the lowering of trade barriers with Central America will be detrimental. President Bush, who strongly favors CAFTA, may not end up with favorable vote on the agreement, expected to come up in the coming months.

## PLANET DEBATE POLITICS DISAD ANSWERS: CAFTA BAD

CAFTA WILL REDUCE WAGES IN THE US AND INCREASE UNEMPLOYMENT-- Barclay '05  
[Eliza; "CAFTA draws wide opposition;" World Peace Herald; 28 April 05;  
<http://www.wpherald.com/storyview.php?StoryID=20050428-045757-1117r>;  
downloaded 29 April 05]

The U.S. Business and Industry Council says the United States will only see reduced wages and unemployment by sending to Central America more textiles to be assembled and sent right back to the United States.

Alan Tonelson, a research fellow with the council, said CAFTA is an outsourcing agreement that allows American multinational companies and retailers better access to low-wage production.

CAFTA MEANS A BLOW TO THE US ECONOMY IN SEVERAL WAYS-- Barclay '05  
[Eliza; "CAFTA draws wide opposition;" World Peace Herald; 28 April 05;  
<http://www.wpherald.com/storyview.php?StoryID=20050428-045757-1117r>;  
downloaded 29 April 05]

"Expanded trade with Central America will become one more force adding to already dangerous high U.S. trade and current account deficits, and increasing downward pressure on the U.S. dollar," he told United Press International in an e-mail. "It will also increase the migration abroad of the types of relatively high-paying manufacturing jobs that generations of working-class Americans have relied on to build middle-class lives for themselves."

CAFTA PROVIDES NO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION-- Barclay '05  
[Eliza; "CAFTA draws wide opposition;" World Peace Herald; 28 April 05;  
<http://www.wpherald.com/storyview.php?StoryID=20050428-045757-1117r>;  
downloaded 29 April 05]

Some environmental groups have argued natural resource protection and pollution prevention promised under NAFTA never occurred, and conditions along the U.S.-Mexico border have worsened with the influx of U.S. companies. These organizations, which include big U.S. groups like the Sierra Club and Friends of the Earth, say CAFTA does not provide enough protections for the environment and even disallows member countries from enacting new environmental regulations if they appear to inhibit trade.

## PLANET DEBATE POLITICS DISAD ANSWERS: CAFTA GOOD

### CAFTA WOULD BENEFIT US BUSINESS-- Chang '05

[I-Wei J. Chang; "Businesses see benefits in CAFTA;" The Business Gazette; 29 April 05; <http://www.gazette.net/200517/business/news/272665-1.html>; downloaded 28 April 05]

Destler said CAFTA would benefit U.S. fabric producers, by giving them access to Central American apparel manufacturers, who would get privileged access to U.S. markets in return. "If you stop having this privileged access to U.S. markets, you take away the incentive for [Central American apparel companies] to import American fabric," Destler said. CAFTA would be good news for an Owings Mills company that supplies embroidered labels and brands -- such as Nike's trademark swoosh -- for clothing companies, said a company official. "It will benefit our business because of the ability to be able to serve apparel brands and factories in Central America," said Susan Ganz, CEO of Lion Brothers, which has a small, but emerging, customer base in Central America.

### CAFTA TAPS INTO BUSINESS THAT WOULD OTHERWISE MOVE TO CHINA-- Ünlüby '05

[Orçun; "State businesses lobby for CAFTA;" The Chronicle; 25 April 2005; <http://www.chronicle.duke.edu/vnews/display.v/ART/2005/04/25/426cca059c356>; downloaded 28 April 05]

"CAFTA is created basically to help Central American sewing machines," Ballenger said. "If we don't pass CAFTA, [businesses] will go to China." Ballenger contended that China has an unstable government and that it is in the interest of U.S. trade to invest in Central America. Fabrics produced in textile factories are shipped largely to sewing factories in Central America that stitch clothing for U.S. apparel makers and retailers. "We developed Central American industries, which created jobs for them," Ballenger said, adding that failing to pass CAFTA would encourage more Latino immigration.

North Carolina accounts for 11 percent of the \$15.7 billion in U.S. shipments to the CAFTA countries, ranking third among U.S. states. The \$1.7 billion in goods shipped to the six countries last year makes the group of nations North Carolina's second-largest trading partner after Canada, according to the U.S. Commerce Department.

### CAFTA WILL BRING JOBS TO US STATES-- Ünlüby '05

[Orçun; "State businesses lobby for CAFTA;" The Chronicle; 25 April 2005; <http://www.chronicle.duke.edu/vnews/display.v/ART/2005/04/25/426cca059c356>; downloaded 28 April 05]

A U.S. Chamber of Commerce study projected that CAFTA would create more than 5,000 jobs in North Carolina in its first year alone. North Carolinian apparel sellers VF Corp. of Greensboro—which manufactures popular brands like The North Face, Lee, Nautica and Kipling—and Sara Lee Branded Apparel of Winston-Salem actively support CAFTA. Some of their executives were present at the congressional hearings last week and lobbied for the agreement.

## AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING: WESTERN TRAINING

AFRICAN NATIONS SHOULD BE GIVEN THE CAPACITY TO ACT-Bergman '03

[Eric; Visiting Scholar at the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University; "The Provision of Lethal Military Equipment: French, UK, and US Peacekeeping Policies Towards Africa"; Security Dialogue; June 2003]

African militaries need to be given the means to fulfill the responsibilities that the international community is placing on African countries and regional organizations. For numerous reasons, many African heads of state and government have kept their armed forces weak,<sup>8</sup> while resource constraints further complicate efforts to professionalize the military. However, as a widely heralded study on UN peace operations admonishes, troop-contributing nations must be prepared to deploy contingents with the requisite materiel and skills to do the job (United Nations, 2000: paras 102–117). This is particularly true for African-led missions, where the level of international support is considerably less than that of UN missions. Necessary aid should be given while infusing African militaries with a respect for democratic principles and human rights. And regional initiatives and mechanisms to control the availability of small arms should be respected.

THE NEED FOR SLIGHT REFORM SHOULD NOT BLOCK OPPORTUNITY-Bergman '03

[Eric; Visiting Scholar at the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University; "The Provision of Lethal Military Equipment: French, UK, and US Peacekeeping Policies Towards Africa"; Security Dialogue; June 2003]

It appears, however, that some oversight mechanisms can be strengthened. Although ACRI did not include lethal equipment, examination of the program suggests that oversight became lax when the recipients were no longer actively engaged, as was the case with Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda. When the recipient country continues to be engaged, oversight is more effective. When trainers returned once or twice a year (and service warranties were active), the equipment provided was accounted for and generally found to be in good working order. Now that training is over, it will be important to ascertain what happens with the equipment. This is particularly a concern with the materiel given to Nigeria under OFR. While the USA will continue to engage Ghana and Senegal directly under the ACOTA program, the US Congress refused to fund a project under WASP that would have provided additional training to OFR-trained units. The motive for the refusal is understandable,<sup>56</sup> but an important opportunity to safeguard an investment and assist an active participant in peacekeeping on the continent may have been squandered.

CRISIS-DRIVEN REACTIVE RESPONSES ARE LESS EFFECTIVE-Bergman '03

[Eric; Visiting Scholar at the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University; "The Provision of Lethal Military Equipment: French, UK, and US Peacekeeping Policies Towards Africa"; Security Dialogue; June 2003]

Analysis of the recently-completed and longer-term training programs offered under ACRI suggests that a link between receiving the training and equipment and an enhanced willingness to participate in peace operations is difficult to establish. However, the provision of lethal equipment has occurred after a political commitment to provide troops has been made, and the link between receipt and use is thus quite strong. This is because the assistance has tended to be crisis-driven and reactive. The level of support has also often been below what is required – or nonexistent. A more proactive and generous policy is warranted given the needs of African militaries and the increasing demands being placed on them to undertake peace operations on their continent.

## AFRICAN PEACEKEEPERS: WESTERN TRAINING ANSWERS

### THE WEST IS ALREADY TRAINING AFRICAN PEACEKEEPERS-Bergman '03

[Eric; Visiting Scholar at the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University; "The Provision of Lethal Military Equipment: French, UK, and US Peacekeeping Policies Towards Africa"; Security Dialogue; June 2003]

IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 1990s, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States developed policies aimed at augmenting the peacekeeping capabilities of African countries.<sup>1</sup> These policies came about largely because the United Nations Security Council, of which all three countries are permanent members, began to scale back its commitment to UN peacekeeping operations in favor of regional initiatives, in deference to Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.

### WRONG TO ENHANCE THE PROBLEM OF SMALL ARMS IN AFRICA-Bergman '03

[Eric; Visiting Scholar at the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University; "The Provision of Lethal Military Equipment: French, UK, and US Peacekeeping Policies Towards Africa"; Security Dialogue; June 2003]

It is somewhat ironic that the provision of lethal equipment should become a more prominent part of these three countries' policies, given widespread efforts to combat the scourge of small arms.<sup>5</sup> Global efforts include the recently concluded international conference convened under the UN's auspices to address the challenge small arms pose to international peace and security (United Nations, 2001). African countries have also undertaken numerous complementary initiatives at the subregional and continental levels.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, previous materiel provided by the three countries has often not been very effective or, in some instances, has compounded a crisis.

### TRAINING PROGRAMS OFTEN UNDERMINE PEACE AND SECURITY-Bergman '03

[Eric; Visiting Scholar at the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University; "The Provision of Lethal Military Equipment: French, UK, and US Peacekeeping Policies Towards Africa"; Security Dialogue; June 2003]

A second irony is that these policies support militaries that often have undermined peace and security. The hundred or so coups d'états and political assassinations in which African militaries and individual soldiers have been involved<sup>7</sup> suggest that aid to armed forces runs the risk of being diverted to unintended use. However, with more than 50 countries on the continent, it is important not to generalize. Numerous factors – such as the nature of a country's government and its economic performance – explain why militaries have seized (or attempted to seize) control of particular governments. Furthermore, past behavior does not necessarily predict future conduct. Armies are not necessarily predisposed to flout the rule of law or to abuse human rights. Thus, while it is important to recognize the potential pitfalls of providing military training and equipment, such concerns should not result in inaction.

## CHILD SOLDIER ANSWERS

LEGALISTIC APPROACH TO CHILD SOLDIERS IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE-Millard '01  
[Ananda; Researcher at the International Peace Research Institute; Researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, "Children in Armed Conflicts: Transcending Legal Responses"; Security Dialogue; June 2001]

This article suggests that the primarily legalistic approach that dominates the international debate about child soldiers is based on a limited understanding of the issues at hand. Moreover, existing legal standards have some unintended consequences that are to the detriment of the children fighting today's wars. The above thesis is based on the following two central tenets. First, we need to recognize that identifying the use of children as active participants in war as a violation of international legal standards alone is too limited: it should also be understood as a manifestation of the evolution of warfare. Hence, in order to address the issue of child soldiers, we need to acknowledge the value of examining the dynamics of new wars. Second, we must acknowledge that the international community generally has little ability to oversee and control conflict conduct, and the illegality of some of the acts conducted in modern warfare serves as a motive to make such actions covert. This should prompt us to search for a field that is better suited to examining the child soldier problem, which, for instance, could be placed within the broader framework of studies of new wars.

SOLUTIONS TO CHILD SOLDIERS OFTEN IGNORE THAT CHILDREN WILLINGLY FIGHT-Millard '01

[Ananda; Researcher at the International Peace Research Institute; Researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, "Children in Armed Conflicts: Transcending Legal Responses"; Security Dialogue; June 2001]

The reference made to children and their involvement in armed conflict as outlined in these documents tends to support the tenet that children have neither the right to autonomy nor the capability for either self-protection or self-preservation. Children tend to be identified as 'non-participatory victims' of armed conflict.<sup>9</sup> This contradicts the reality faced by many young people involved in armed conflict. Not only do some children claim to have chosen to become active participants independently, in some cases their decision to participate has been prompted by their view of the circumstances that surround them.<sup>10</sup> In Sierra Leone, child soldiers explained that one of the reasons they had decided to join armed groups was that they were unable to cope with the economic realities they faced due to lack of education.

LEGAL ANSWERS UNDERMINE EFFORTS TO STOP CHILD SOLDIERS-Millard '01  
[Ananda; Researcher at the International Peace Research Institute; Researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, "Children in Armed Conflicts: Transcending Legal Responses"; Security Dialogue; June 2001]

Governments involved in civil wars are quite often unable to ensure that their opponents uphold legal standards. Indeed, in some cases, the governments themselves violate standards they have ratified. This is done because the costs of violating the legal standards are outweighed by the benefits gained thereby.<sup>15</sup> As a result, these legal documents inherently undermine the prevention of the use of children in conflict at the field level. Interestingly, the only efforts that have succeeded in preventing the use of children in conflict have been localized indigenous approaches, of which little is known.<sup>16</sup> Indigenous approaches seem to have been able to brake the modality of conflicts, with people building on existing cultural practices to refuse to permit the use of their children in a conflict. The participation of children has also been nonexistent in cases where children were not regarded as useful or effective instruments of war.

CHILD SOLDIERS ARE LESS LIKELY TO BE INVOLVED IN DDR PROGRAMS-Millard '01  
[Ananda; Researcher at the International Peace Research Institute; Researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, "Children in Armed Conflicts: Transcending Legal Responses"; Security Dialogue; June 2001]

This article presents an interesting dichotomy for international law and politics. While the use of child soldiers is illegal, countries that do use children as soldiers are required to reintegrate them after war. In practice, countries that use child soldiers are very rarely open about it, and in view of the lack of an acknowledgement that child soldiers existed, the reintegration guidelines proposed by Article 39 are not applied.<sup>18</sup> This is not because child soldiers did not exist, but because, if a country denies that they existed, no organization or government is willing to put at risk an often fragile peace in order to ensure that children who participated in the war receive the appropriate postwar attention. This was the case in Mozambique, where the use of children was effectively overlooked as part of the peace process, despite the knowledge that children had been employed.<sup>19</sup> Under these conditions, the issue of child soldiers is something muttered about in certain circles, but no one is confronted with it, and children are often excluded from any formal process of what, in UN terminology, is referred to as Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).

UN LACKS INTEGRATED, UNIVERSAL APPROACH TO CHILD SOLDIERS-Millard '01  
[Ananda; Researcher at the International Peace Research Institute; Researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, "Children in Armed Conflicts: Transcending Legal Responses"; Security Dialogue; June 2001]

The international community can act to overcome the dichotomy presented by the relationship between Articles 38 and 39. For example, if the international community in a categorical and consistent manner could provide amnesty for using children in conflict to all perpetrating parties, this would increase the possibility that reintegration efforts could become commonplace. If no similar measures are taken, children will be left to rely on independent relief initiatives that manage to bypass the legal question of recruitment by assisting children through innovative programmes catering for child soldiers under more politically correct disguises. The UN has funded such programmes and has approved resolutions supporting efforts to reintegrate former child soldiers; there is, however, no standard practice in this regard. The appointment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict can be regarded as a positive move by the UN, but this office lacks the means to ensure reintegration in a systematic fashion.

LEGAL STATEMENTS AND GUIDELINES CANNOT SOLVE, MUST APPROACH FROM DIFFERENT AVENUE-Millard '01

[Ananda; Researcher at the International Peace Research Institute; Researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, "Children in Armed Conflicts: Transcending Legal Responses"; Security Dialogue; June 2001]

As things stand, the existence of legal statements prohibiting the use of child soldiers, such as Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, unintentionally prevents the fulfilment of provisions in the same document aimed at ensuring their postwar reintegration (Article 39). The same dichotomy applies to the optional protocol and to the ILO Convention 182, which also provide for the reintegration of children who have participated in armed conflict. Legislation is unable both to prevent recruitment and to enforce reintegration, so we need to re-evaluate the use of legal standards as the foundations for our dealings with the problem of child soldier recruitment at the field level. In short, although international legal standards prohibiting the use of child soldiers and calling for their reintegration deserve credit for bringing the issue to the international agenda, these documents have not been successful in their practical implementation. There is a need for exploring new avenues, first to understand, then ultimately to mitigate the problem.

## CYPRUS: US ROLE

### CYPRUS IS CENTRAL TO US INTERESTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN-Guney '04

[Aylin; Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Bilkent University; "The USA's Role in Mediating the Cyprus Conflict: A Story of Success or Failure?"; Security Dialogue; March 2004]

US strategic interests in the post-Cold War Mediterranean can be considered as both regional and global. The regional perspective usually centres on either Southern Europe or the Middle East, whereas the global one concerns general crisis management. In addition to the security of Israel, issues such as access to oil, migration and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the possession of authoritarian states in the region, such as Iraq or Iran, have become vital concerns for US strategic interests (Holmes, 1995: 217). Indeed, this is the main justification for the post-Cold War military hegemony in the Mediterranean revealed by the existence of the US Sixth Fleet (Montagnon, 1998: 12–13). The USA also has strong national interests in the survival of Israel, a stake that has become particularly important since the Gulf War in 1991. As a result of these policy preferences, and owing to its special strategic location, Cyprus lost no weight in US policy formulations. On the contrary, it grew in importance since the USA regarded it as 'a valuable partner in the fight against the new global threats of proliferation, terror, illegal narcotics, and international crime' (Müftüler-Baç, 1999: 567), and in addition 'the two countries have shared values and a shared commitment to building a world based on open markets, democratic principles and the rule of law'.

### FAILURE TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS WILL LEAD TO A CRISIS-Guney '04

[Aylin; Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Bilkent University; "The USA's Role in Mediating the Cyprus Conflict: A Story of Success or Failure?"; Security Dialogue; March 2004]

Although the recent historic decision by the TRNC and Turkey to lift restrictions on the free movement of Greek and Turkish Cypriots across the 'Green Line' is a positive though ambiguous novelty, it seems clear at present that both sides continue to stick to their positions and cannot easily reach an agreement, as revealed in the rejection of the Annan Plan(s). Therefore, unless progress is achieved, the post-2004 period may be marked by a possible crisis triggered by the accession of Cyprus to the EU as a divided island. This will certainly pose serious challenges for political stability in and around Cyprus owing to the status of the Turkish troops stationed on the north of the island.

US POLICY HAS SHIFTED SINCE IRAQ WAR, LACKING FOCUS ON CYPRUS--Guney '04  
[Aylin; Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration,  
Bilkent University; "The USA's Role in Mediating the Cyprus Conflict: A Story of Success or  
Failure?"; Security Dialogue; March 2004]

US Ambassador to Athens Nicholas Burns has stated that 'President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell have been personally interested in this problem'.<sup>7</sup> He encourages the Cypriot accession to the EU followed by the accession of Turkey,<sup>8</sup> since 'the prospect of membership would encourage the Turkish Cypriots to negotiate a solution',<sup>9</sup> and he remains committed to the UN effort to find a just and lasting settlement to the Cyprus problem.<sup>10</sup> In the USA's view, the basis of a solution to the problem is a bizonal, bicomunal federation, and 'it is possible to reach a settlement that addresses the legitimate concerns of both sides and promotes regional stability'.<sup>11</sup> However, the US policy in Cyprus seems to have been affected by a redefinition of US interests as a result of the Bush administration's War on Iraq, since the war has had disruptive implications for US–EU and US–Turkish relations.

SUSPENDED SETTLEMENT COULD LEAD TO A DISRUPTION OF NATO-Guney '04  
[Aylin; Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration,  
Bilkent University; "The USA's Role in Mediating the Cyprus Conflict: A Story of Success or  
Failure?"; Security Dialogue; March 2004]

If future settlement talks are indefinitely suspended and the likelihood of a permanent division of the island increases, this would represent a 'sweeping breakdown' (Stilides, 2002: 1–2) in Turkish–Greek relations, which could lead to a possible disruption in NATO – with regional consequences to follow (Payne, 1998: 15). Though the current US administration's policy towards Cyprus seems to resemble the previous tripartite US policy of supporting (a) a solution in line with UN Resolutions, (b) Cyprus's membership of the EU and (c) Turkey's membership of the EU, the USA will be unable to mediate in a future crisis since the Bush administration seems to have neither the necessary leverage nor the requisite legitimacy – to say nothing of trust – in the eyes of the parties involved: the EU, Turkey and Greece. Therefore, it is highly probable that the USA will fail in any attempts it makes to mediate in any crisis that might arise as a result of the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004 as a divided island.

## GENDER IDENTITY AND SECURITY

MUST ANALZE GENDER TO UNDERSTAND SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AFTER CONFLICT-  
Hoogensen and Rottem '04

[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein,  
Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the  
Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

Identity is central to our understanding of security (McSweeney, 1999: 5). Although identity in the security debate is most often linked to ethnicity and race, we would like to demonstrate the significance of gender for security: 'discussions on cultural identity and societal security would be enriched by considering different constructions of masculinity (and femininity) as relevant variables of cultural and political identities' (Zalewski, 1998: 38).

Women's experiences of violence and their security needs differ significantly from those of men (Boulding, 2000: 107; SAP Canada, 2002: 3; United Nations, 2002: 4–5). Women are also usually the most insecure, disadvantaged and marginalized (SAP Canada, 2003: 3). However, gender and gender research have not been adequately engaged by the security studies literature (Blanchard, 2003; Hansen, 2000). Recognizing gender as a significant dimension of identity and security opens the door to non-state-based views of security and aptly illustrates how identity shapes individual and collective security needs. Gender analyses reveal the structures that neutralize identity through assumptions of the Universal Man. Removing these structural distortions allows us to hear and respond to the identities within.

SECURITY DISCOURSE IS LOCKED IN MASCULINE ASSUMPTIONS-Hoogensen and  
Rottem '04

[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein,  
Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the  
Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

The concept of security, as it has been largely argued within the human security debate, must disentangle itself from the purely militaristic dimension but prevail as a notion that entails a logic of necessity. This is seen in connection to means. The end is to securitize individuals, not a system of states. Ole Wæver and the Copenhagen School address the historic dimensions inherent in the security discourse. Barry Buzan's (1991) *People, States and Fear* is a seminal contribution to the security debate, as noted by Bill McSweeney (1999: 52–78) in his critical evaluation of the work. Wæver's 1995 essay in *On Security* has also been influential, as has Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde's (1998) *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, discussed by Lene Hansen (2000: 286) in her critique of the Copenhagen School and its barriers to gender through speech acts, among other things. Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde elaborated on the various sectors in which the concept of security could be expanded, including societal security, which is rooted in identity. However, security and securitization do not escape their traditional roots, as the state primarily remains – albeit not exclusively – both referent and security actor. Securitization is negative, and the potential for change still appears limited.

#### GENDER OFFERS A LENS TO CONNECT IDENTITY TO SECURITY-Hoogensen and Rottem '04

[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein, Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

Susan Brison wrote that in the wake of 9/11 the journal *Le Monde* declared 'We are all New Yorkers', giving the appearance of a unified identity the world over. Thereafter, she noted, the feelings of an apparent global unity or identity subsided as other identities were expressed on the basis of nationality, race and religion, though 'gender was not mentioned much' (Brison, 2002: 435). Does gender have anything to do with identity? 'Does gender have anything to do with what I am, as a reader, scholar, and a woman? The answer is a resounding yes' (Wilson, 1999: xi). Gender is inherently linked to identity. Gender, reflecting the interests and security concerns of significant groups, can illustrate the impact and importance of societal security, as well as the meaning it gives to the security dynamic. Gender analyses expose many of our assumptions about the structures we live with or within, including the state, society and security. Concepts such as the state and security are normalized to the point of being, at the very least, deeply rooted structures (*à la Wæver*) that many have considered impossible or undesirable to change. They have become 'the way it is'. Through gender, we can make linkages from the individual to identity, and from identity to security. The adage that 'the personal is political' also rings true for security studies. An individual's security is political, needs to be heard and allows for security to finally 'trickle up'.

#### GENDER ANALYSIS CRITICAL TO UNDERSTAND OPPRESSION OF WOMYN-Hoogensen and Rottem '04

[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein, Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

Gender pertains to the construction of relationships between male and female, and the attendant power dynamics found within these relationships. Gender speaks to the divisions we have constructed regarding our sexuality: 'gender is the ways that sex and sexuality become power relations in society' (Carver, 1996: 14). Recognition of the power structures we have created within and around these divisions enables us to understand not only the identities we choose for ourselves, but also the identities that are imposed upon us, not unlike the assumed security needs that are imposed from the 'top down'. Gender analyses have shown us how these power structures function and in what ways they need to be broken down to allow for the articulation of identities stemming from the individual. As Carver points out, 'Gender is not a synonym for women!' (Carver, 1996: 4). However women's experiences have played a central role in gender analyses, as women have been marginalized, disadvantaged and made insecure within existing gendered power structures.

#### DECONSTRUCTING PATRIARCHY IS CENTRAL TO GENDER ANALYSIS-Hoogensen and Rottem '04

[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein, Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

Patriarchy is the central structure of focus in gender analysis. Men as well as women are affected by patriarchy, albeit in different ways: It is not men-on-top that makes something patriarchal. It's men who are recognized and claim a certain form of masculinity, for the sake of being more valued, more 'serious,' and 'the protectors of/and controllers of those people who are less masculine' that makes any organization, any community, any society patriarchal. (Cohn & Enloe, 2003: 1192)

#### PATRIARCHY NORMALIZES HIDDEN GENDER-Hoogensen and Rottem '04

[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein, Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

Patriarchy normalizes constructed gender dichotomies. It normalizes practices and relationships so that gender becomes hidden, unessential and irrelevant. Patriarchy is the expression of the dominant masculinism, which many scholars argue is the basis of Western society and knowledge (Peterson, 1992: 12). Some, such as John Hoffman, argue that early feminist research gave masculinity an essentialist identity that was permanently embedded within concepts such as sovereignty (Runyan, 2002: 364). More recent feminist and gender scholarship has examined masculine identities and the ways in which dominant masculinities are formed, maintained and sustained as patriarchal structures (Hooper, 2001; Kimmel, 2000; Braudy, 2003, Bairner, 1999)

#### PATRIARCHY CREATES THE NOTION OF THE UNIVERSAL MAN, LEADING TO FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT SECURITY-Hoogensen and Rottem '04

[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein, Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

How does this play out in the identity-as-security relationship? McSweeney (1999: 73) states that 'identity is not a fact of society; it is a process of negotiation among people and interest groups'. As stated above, however, patriarchy ensures that gender becomes hidden and irrelevant in the identity equation. Patriarchy creates the Universal Man upon whom we develop our assumptions about security. McSweeney, who has recognized the importance of gender in identity (McSweeney, 1999: 97–98) is correct in his claim that identity is negotiated, but he needs to take this a step further. Gender analysis demonstrates that the negotiation for identity is imbalanced and distorted. Identities are imposed by the structure of patriarchy, while at the same time they are being formed by individuals living within the structure.

#### IMPOSED IDENTITIES EXCLUDE WOMEN'S VISIONS OF SECURITY-Hoogensen and Rottem '04

[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein, Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

From a gender perspective, both McSweeney's and Wæver's approaches to identity are relevant. For example, a woman's identity, or lack thereof, is established outside of her scope of decisionmaking, such that her identity is imposed from above, by society and/or the state. In today's post-9/11 world, such imposed identities have been manifested through 'contending masculinities that vie to reduce women to symbols of either fundamentalist traditionalism or Western hypermodernity' (Runyan, 2002: 362). Hansen (2000: 287) notes that societal security as defined by the Copenhagen School 'subsumes' the identity of woman within other identities of religion, race and nationality. In addition or opposition to these impositions of identity, however, a woman may also negotiate her identity on her own terms.

#### SECURITY CLAIMS OF WOMYN ARE IGNORED BY DOMINANT DISCOURSE-Hoogensen and Rottem '04

[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein, Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

Security claims cannot be heard from identities that have been enveloped and hidden by the dominant discourse. At the same time, though, women in many different ways have been contradicting the dominant discourse by finding ways to express their identities as women in addition to their other identities. Their experiences exemplify the complexity of life experiences and perspectives that inform their diverse securities. Wæver's acknowledgement (through Erik Ringmar's analysis) that identity cannot be properly understood and known from the perspective of the system but instead needs to be understood through the state and statesman is, in effect, not dissimilar to our argument here. Identity cannot be understood from the top down (Wæver, 2002: 21). Wæver's approach, however, is not open to digging deeper to individual articulations of identity.

#### INCLUSION OF WOMYN'S VIEWS OF SECURITY LEADS TO THE RESOURCES TO MAKE THEM SECURE-Hoogensen and Rottem '04

[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein, Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

When women's articulations of security are recognized and heard, this results in access to the appropriate resources women need to ensure their security, as well as creating new foundations for theoretical reorientations of security. Although such gender theorizing and practice has been taking place for over a decade, offering many fruitful and important avenues of research in identity and security, it has not been able to break through to the mainstream security debates. Feminist perspectives have remained on the margins of international relations and security studies, in part because of 'a view that feminist theorizing is always, necessarily, and most usefully done by women, for women, about women' (Carver, 1996: 4).

SECURITY IS CONCEPTUALIZED IN MASCULINE TERMS-Hoogensen and Rottem '04  
[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein,  
Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the  
Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

Blanchard (2003: 1289) notes that the realm of security is 'part of the elite world of masculine high politics', and that the discipline of international relations has 'only recently made a place for feminist analysis, and then only grudgingly'. Ann Tickner states that international relations creates 'an inhospitable home from the more expansive local/global trajectories of feminist inquiry' (Runyan, 2002: 361). The realization that 'realist hypermasculinity is responsible for the emergence and eventual militarization of the state system with its imagery of protector/protected, inside/outside, and order/anarchy – a situation in which security for the few is bought at the cost of insecurity of the many' (Zalewski and Parpart, 1998: 87) appears to be difficult for mainstream scholarship to accept or engage with. The 'so what' response of militaries to gender awareness in security (SAP Canada, 2002: 20) appears to be shared by mainstream security scholars.

SECURITY DEVELOPED THROUGH GENDER ANALYSIS BREAKS DOWN STATIST  
THINKING AND DIVISIONS ACROSS THE GLOBE-Hoogensen and Rottem '04(\*)  
[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein,  
Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the  
Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

The normalization of women's identity and experience speaks directly to the decisionmaking involved in determining who is secure and who is not. Security through gender identity demands a reorientation and restructuring of the concept and of international relations in general, enabling the research to foreground local/global politics; problematize statist thinking and organization; disrupt boundaries between First World and Third World, public and private, and local and global; reveal interconnections among political, economic, cultural, social, and ecological spheres (Runyan, 2002: 362).

GENDERED ANALYSIS FOCUSES ON THE STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE THAT CAUSES  
CONFLICT, NOT INDIVIDUALIZED CRISES-Hoogensen and Rottem '04  
[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein,  
Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the  
Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

Feminist security literature addresses the role of women (or lack thereof) in the 'corridors of power' (Blanchard, 2003), as well as the gendered structure within IR theory itself. Through gender, security becomes reconstructed on the basis of women's experiences of violence, interrelating violence on the local, national and international levels, and eradicating structural violence instead of primarily focusing on the direct violence of war (Tickner, 1992; Sylvester, 1994; Peterson & Runyan, 1999). Seen through these gender-aware lenses, security cannot remain the exclusive 'widened' fortress Wæver et al. have tried to create.

**INCLUDING WOMYN IS NOT ENOUGH; A GENDER PERSPECTIVE MUST INFORM ALL APPROACHES TO PEACE AND SECURITY-Hoogensen and Rottem '04**

[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein, Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

This contention is further supported by the development that gender appears to have more meaning and relevance to security in practice than in the halls of academe (Blanchard, 2003: 1306). Bureaucracy and policy appear to be leading the way in recognizing the important linkages between gender and security. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of October 2000 not only focuses on violence experienced by women, but also recognizes the important role a gender perspective has with regard to peacebuilding and conflict resolution – in other words, with regard to ensuring international peace and security. Further work by the UN on this agenda resulted in the 2002 document *Women, Peace and Security* (United Nations, 2002). This study acknowledges there is work to be done regarding the integration of women's security needs and a gender perspective in all aspects of international peace and security. UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan states that 'women still form a minority of those who participate in peace and security negotiations, and receive less attention than men in post-conflict agreements, disarmament and reconstruction' (United Nations, 2002: ix). Addressing this means not only ensuring that women are at the table during negotiations, but also ensuring that a gender perspective informs all approaches to international peace and security.

**GENDER ANALYSIS DESTROYS TRADITIONAL BARRIERS AND DIVISIONS, AND IS MOST NEEDED IN AFRICA-Hoogensen and Rottem '04**

[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein, Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

Gender awareness and linkages between women and security were the focus of the South Asia Partnership Canada Forum Report (SAP Canada, 2002). Women from Nepal, Bangladesh, Pakistan and other South Asian countries expressed their views about what security means to women in the South Asian region. Among things that were discussed were sexual violence, domestic violence, economic deprivation and political isolation. Linkages were made between violence on the battlefield and economic insecurity and the increase of domestic violence at home (SAP Canada, 2002: 7, 8, 14, 17, 18). Some of these articulations of insecurity mirror the experiences of women in what are considered to be 'secure' regions, such as the rates of domestic violence among US military personnel and their families, and increases in domestic violence just prior to and just after military deployment (Lutz & Elliston, 2002). Gender perspectives not only allow for articulations of security needs by individuals, but illustrate the ways in which these security needs transcend some of the traditional barriers we have placed between individuals on the basis of north/south or secure/insecure divisions. As such, it is 'a new dimension that women bring in the whole question of developing an alternative discourse of human security, alternate to the realism paradigm of power and security' (SAP Canada, 2002: 7). And, as Heidi Hudson (2000: 79) states in her examination of human security needs in Africa, 'nowhere more than in Africa is the security of all people linked to the security of the women of the continent'.

#### GENDER ANALYSIS FORCES RE-EVALUATION OF SECURITY POLITICS-Hoogensen and Rottem '04

[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein, Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

Understanding security through gender identity forces us to re-evaluate traditional security politics, where security and securitization are traditionally understood as the top of the state hierarchy, where securitization is the exclusive domain of extraordinary measures as defined by perceived threats toward the state and where securitization is a negative process that demands emergency action 'outside the bounds of normal political procedure' (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 24). Securitization understood thus means failure: failure to address the issue within 'normal bounds' (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 29).

#### GENDERED ANALYSIS ALLOWS A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF THE VIOLENCE THAT CREATES DESTRUCTIVE CONFLICT AND PROVIDES THE TOOLS TO DEAL WITH IT-Hoogensen and Rottem '04

[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein, Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

A reorientation of the security dynamic that removes the hierarchy and prioritization of some securities over others – acknowledging securities laterally, democratically, and in mutually influential and dynamic ways – moves the concept of security away from the patriarchal and hierarchical structure in which the prevailing security discourse is encased. Thus, it is possible, and beneficial, to recognize security emanating from democratic roots – not in a hierarchical sense but as a multiplicity of securities flowing concurrently. We can then start to recognize ways in which these securities are linked to one another, rather than isolating them from one another and prioritizing them individually. Such linkages can then inform policy, balancing the complementarity of the securities while recognizing ways in which they possibly conflict. This means that we recognize the interconnections between local violence such as domestic violence and global violence such as war, and we recognize that ignoring the former prevents us from fully understanding the causes of the latter. Recognizing the nature and causes of these different levels of violence allows us to work with, and cooperate on, these securities before they develop into the sort of atrocities that are often the primary focus of the human security agenda.

#### GENDERED ANALYSIS ALLOWS FOR EXAMINATION OF ROOT CAUSES OF WAR AND EXPLOITATION-Hoogensen and Rottem '04

[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein, Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

A broadened understanding of security can work towards prevention. The security dynamic is always in flux, and security is not a 'condition' to be repaired and done with ('band aid' solutions). It takes a great deal of awareness and vigilance to be secure, as well as recognition of the impacts of economic, health, environmental, community and personal security. A broader definition of security, trickling up and out to policymakers and community action, allows for deeper and more effective exploration of the insecurities articulated by diverse identities – including through gender – regarding famine, disease, the sex trade, environmental degradation, oppression and, among many other things, war.

STATE SECURITY CANNOT BE EQUATED WITH THE SECURITY OF THE PEOPLE-  
Hoogensen and Rottem '04

[Gunhild, Postdoctoral Fellow in International Relations, University of Tromsø. and Svein, Doctoral Student in International Relations at the University of Tromsø; "Gender Identity and the Subject of Security"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

What we learn from Wæver et al. is that identity is important. The greatest evidence that the definition of security must be widened is the debate about security itself. The debate illustrates the extent to which security is understood in so many different but important and relevant ways, including traditional as well as non-traditional approaches. The failure of the debate so far lies in assuming that each avenue presented is the avenue to security.

When we take a moment to step back from our attacks and parries, we can see that we are plainly demonstrating the complexity of security. In fact, there is a great deal of agreement and positive movement among the scholars who argue in favour of some sort of expansion of security. That they come to the debate from different perspectives is only a benefit – it illustrates just how necessary it is to understand security in a broader sense. What these debates clearly show is that state security cannot be equated with the security of the people. Through identity, individuals, communities, 'the people' have a legitimate avenue to achieve security on their own terms, 'trickling up' to the policymakers.

## HEGEMONY: US IS AN EMPIRE

### DISMISSING US EMPIRE AS VIRTUAL IGNORES THE REAL EMPIRE-Cox '04

[Michael; Professor, International Relations at London School of Economics and Political Science; "Empire by Denial? Debating US Power"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

But that was not the end to it. Stimulated in large part by the election of George W. Bush and his muscular response to 11 September 2001, some now began to think what, in American terms, were quite unthinkable thoughts.<sup>4</sup> In an era of unchallenged US military supremacy – it was now argued – where the United States effectively spent more on security than the rest of the world put together, in an international system where its reach was becoming more extensive than ever, why not accept that the USA was either becoming, or had already become, an empire? Admittedly, few may have wanted to acknowledge its existence (Prestowitz, 2003: 19–50). There was, to be sure, something distinctly 'virtual', 'funny', almost 'incoherent' about this international entity (Walker, 2002; Hanson, 2002; Mann, 2003). Nonetheless, as one wit pointed out, it seemed to look, walk and talk like an empire (Simes, 2003: 93). Thus, why not take the extra step and accept that with whatever qualification or set of quotation marks one wished to place round the word, the United States was – or, more precisely, ran – an empire (Ignatieff, 2003).

### NEOCONS HAVE PUSHED THE US TO AN EXTRAORDINARY ACCEPTANCE OF EMPIRE-Cox '04

[Michael; Professor, International Relations at London School of Economics and Political Science; "Empire by Denial? Debating US Power"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

The imperial turn in the age of Bush was by any stretch of the imagination a most extraordinary phenomenon. After all, 'one of the central themes' in mainstream historiography has always been that that there had never been an American Empire.<sup>5</sup> Not only that: a 'decade ago, certainly two', the very concept of empire would have caused 'righteous indignation' among most US observers. But not any longer (Maier, 2002). As Ronald Wright has noted, 'how recently we believed the age of empire was dead', but how popular the idea was now to become in certain US circles. But something interesting and strange appears to have happened along the way. For whereas in the 1960s the term was all the rage on the left,<sup>6</sup> by the turn of the century it had become the ideological calling card of several key figures on the neoconservative right. And what many of them appeared to be suggesting was quite startling: that under conditions of international anarchy, where order remained the prime concern, the United States had to learn the most important lesson of history – if there was to be any form of order at all, it had to act in the same imperial fashion as the British and Romans had done in the past.

### US EMPIRE IS SECURE, DESPITE CHALLENGES-Cox '04

[Michael; Professor, International Relations at London School of Economics and Political Science; "Empire by Denial? Debating US Power"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

The new imperialists in Washington might have fashioned a dubious set of policies. Their strategy of unilateral assertiveness might have done much to make the United States internationally unpopular, to such a degree that we may now be at the 'end of the neo-conservative moment' (Ikenberry, 2004b). But this does not mean the empire is about to crumble.<sup>18</sup> Presidents may come and grand strategies may go, but the American Empire – one suspects still has a good deal of life left in it.

## SEPTEMBER 11<sup>TH</sup> LEAD TO A NARRATIVE OF THE NEED FOR DOMINANCE TO CONTROL WORLD CHAOS-Cox '04

[Michael; Professor, International Relations at London School of Economics and Political Science; "Empire by Denial? Debating US Power"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

Indeed, in the view of some writers, it was precisely because the United States had been insufficiently assertive in the 1990s that 11 September happened in the first place (Eland, 2002). Such inertia was no longer an option. In a fragmenting postmodern world, where small bands of fanatics could cause havoc and mayhem, there was only one possible solution. Politicians might want to call it something else. And no doubt President Bush would repeat the old mantra that 'America' had no 'empire to extend'.<sup>7</sup> But that is precisely what the United States would have to do. Other existing methods had been tried and found wanting. Now, in a new era, where old forms of deterrence and traditional assumptions about threats no longer held, it was up to the USA to impose its own form of 'peace' on a disorderly world: to fight the savage war of peace (to quote one of the new gurus) so as to protect and enlarge the empire of liberty (Boot, 2002).

## HEGEMONY MUST BE AT THE CENTER OF DISCUSSION ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE US-Cox '04

[Michael; Professor, International Relations at London School of Economics and Political Science; "Empire by Denial? Debating US Power"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

I accept many of these arguments. Indeed, in my Millennium article to which the group of writers in this issue of Security Dialogue have generously responded (Cox, 2003a), I concede that there are both theoretical weaknesses and dangerous policy implications that flow from the notion of an American Empire. Yet rejection of the term is not enough: we have to engage with it in a creative fashion, as others have already tried to do (see, for example, Barkawi & Laffey, 2002; Shaw, 2002). And, as the new conservatives have pointed out, the concept (ambiguous warts and all) does have its uses as a comparative tool of analysis, one that has not been fully exploited in the past, partly for methodological reasons – the term after all is open to different meanings – but largely because it has for so long been associated with a radical critique of US foreign policy. This has been particularly unfortunate and has made it virtually impossible for other commentators to employ the concept at all. My argument is of a quite different order: it is high time to rescue the idea and put it back where it belongs – at the centre of the discussion of what in fact has become the most extensive international system in history. To do this, however, requires some understanding of empires in general, something about which students of international affairs have (with one or two notable exceptions) been remarkably silent over the past few years.<sup>8</sup> It also requires us to shed the myth that the USA has always been a defensive and by definition a most 'reluctant superpower'. As Andrew Bacevich (2002) has shown in a decisive fashion, until we challenge this 'master narrative' (more useful than true, he notes) we will never get anywhere.

US SUPPORT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION MASKS SELFISH INTEREST-Cox '04  
[Michael; Professor, International Relations at London School of Economics and Political Science; "Empire by Denial? Debating US Power"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

But, this still leaves open the problem of how we can legitimately talk of an American Empire when one of the United States' primary objectives in the 20th century has involved support for the right of self-determination. The objection is a perfectly reasonable one. But there is a legitimate answer: if and when the USA did support the creation of new nations, it did not do so out of pure idealism, but because it realistically calculated that the breakup of other empires was likely to decrease the power of rivals while increasing its own weight in a reformed world system. As Williams noted long ago, when and where the US has combated colonialism – both traditional and communist – in its own mind it no doubt did so for the highest possible motive. But the fact remains that it only acted in this fashion (and then not always consistently) in the full knowledge that it would win a host of new and potentially dependent allies as a result.<sup>13</sup> Imperialism, as others have pointed out, can sometimes wear a grimace and sometimes a smile. And, in the case of the USA, nothing was more likely to bring a smile to its face than the thought that while it was winning friends among the new states, it was doing so at the expense first of its European rivals (which is why so many of Europe's leaders disliked Wilson and feared FDR) and then, after 1989, of the Soviet Union.

DESPITE RELATIVE ECONOMIC DECLINE, US IS AN UNMATCHED POWER-Cox '04  
[Michael; Professor, International Relations at London School of Economics and Political Science; "Empire by Denial? Debating US Power"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

Yet, the sceptics still make a good point. Under modern conditions, it is extraordinarily difficult for any single state to exercise preponderant influence at all times, a point made with great force in both a recent radical attempt to theorize the notion of empire<sup>17</sup> and a liberal effort to rubbish it (Nye, 2002). The argument is well made. In fact, it is obvious: under conditions of globalization, where money moves with extraordinary speed in an apparently borderless world, it is very difficult indeed for any state - even one as powerful as the United States - to exercise complete control over all international relations. There is also the question of the USA's own economic capabilities. The United States might have a huge military capacity. However, in the purely material realm, it is far less powerful than it was, say, 20 years ago - before Europe and China became more serious economic actors - or immediately after the war, when it controlled 70% of the world's financial resources. This much is selfevident, and any honest analysis of the 'new' American Empire would have to take this on board. But one should not push the point too far. After all, the US economy continues to account for nearly 30% of world product; it is roughly 40% bigger than any of its nearest rivals; the dollar still remains mighty; and Wall Street is still located at the heart of the international financial system. Furthermore, as the better literature on modern globalization shows, the world economic system is not completely out of control; governments still have a key role to play; and the enormous resources at the US government's disposal not only give it a very large role in shaping the material environment within which we all happen to live, but also provide it with huge influence within those bodies whose function it is to manage the world economy.

## HEGEMONY: ANSWERS

### HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IS A LOW PRIORITY AFTER 9/11-Weiss '04

[Thomas; Professor of Political Science at The Graduate Center of The City University of New York; "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

Nonetheless, and before we close the door on humanitarian intervention, we should remind ourselves to avoid Andrew Hurrell's 'relentless presentism' (Hurrell, 2002: xiii), which reared its head on 11 September 2001. The use of military force to protect human life had been an international priority, but the Al-Qaeda attacks were a political earthquake – changing the strategic landscape, intellectual discourse, and international agenda. And when the dust from the World Trade Center and the Pentagon settled, humanitarian intervention became a tertiary issue.

### US MUST BE A PART OF A RENEWED HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION MOVEMENT-Weiss '04

[Thomas; Professor of Political Science at The Graduate Center of The City University of New York; "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

The sun of humanitarian intervention has set for now. Whether US power will underpin or undermine humanitarian intervention is uncertain. But one thing is clear. It will be decisive. If the responsibility to protect is to flourish, the United States must be on board. The current moment is dark, but that is not to say that humanitarian intervention will not dawn again.

### CRITICS OF US HEGEMONY ARE WRONG-UN AND US ACTION ARE INSEPARABLE-Weiss '04

[Thomas; Professor of Political Science at The Graduate Center of The City University of New York; "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

Today, there are two world 'organizations': the United Nations – global in membership – and the United States – global in reach and power. Critics of US hegemony – and several members of the ICISS are among them – argue that the exercise of military power should be based on UN authority instead of US capacity (Foot, MacFarlane & Mastanduno, 2003; Byers & Nolte, 2003). But the two are inseparable. As its coercive capacity is always on loan, Unled or UN-approved operations with substantial military requirements take place only when Washington approves or at least acquiesces. Although small battalions of British and French soldiers had demonstration effects in toning up UN operations in Sierra Leone in 2000 and the eastern Congo in 2003, US air-lift capacity and military muscle and technology are required for larger and longer-duration deployments. For enforcement (as opposed to traditional peacekeeping), the value added by other militaries is political, not operational.

TURN: THE DANGER COMES FROM TOO LITTLE US INTERVENTION-Weiss '04  
[Thomas; Professor of Political Science at The Graduate Center of The City University of New York; "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

With Washington's focus elsewhere, the danger is not too much but rather too little humanitarian intervention. US and UN dawdling as Liberia came apart in mid-2003 provides a more likely future scenario than any abuse of the responsibility to protect. The ICISS was originally established in response to the Security Council's failure to address dire humanitarian crises in Rwanda and Kosovo. In 1994, intervention was too little and too late to halt or even slow the murder of what may have been as many as 800,000 people in the Great Lakes region of Africa. In 1999, the formidable North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) finessed the Council and waged war for the first time in Kosovo. But many observers saw the 78-day bombing effort as being too much and too early, perhaps creating as much human suffering as it relieved. In both cases, the Security Council was unable to authorize the use of deadly force to protect vulnerable populations.

A HONEST DEBATE, NOT INFLATED RHETORIC, IS NEEDED-Weiss '04  
[Thomas; Professor of Political Science at The Graduate Center of The City University of New York; "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

History counsels caution to anyone even vaguely familiar with so-called humanitarian interventions of the colonial period – or more recently by Washington on behalf of the contras in Nicaragua or by Moscow on behalf of comrades in Budapest and Prague. Concerns about the degradation of sovereignty come often from countries whose borders have been breached by many countries that now champion protecting human beings and ignoring borders. Hence, an honest debate about motivations and likely costs and benefits is required, not visceral accolades because of a qualifying adjective. Such a discussion has become particularly relevant because outside assistance can do more harm than good or can become entangled in a local political economy that favors war (Anderson, 1999; Berdal & Malone, 2000; Duffield, 2001).

US ACTIONS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN SUGGEST A NEED FOR ANALYSIS, NOT A REJECTION OF THE US-Weiss '04  
[Thomas; Professor of Political Science at The Graduate Center of The City University of New York; "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

US rhetoric and the invocation of humanitarian values in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest the heightened need for analysis. Jennifer Welsh notes three ways in which the responsibility to protect and the war against terrorism connect. First, ICISS principles should govern any use of force in international society. Second, 11 September leads one to ask what the community of states could and should have done to prevent massive human rights violations by the Taliban. Third, the issue of selectivity may ebb because the situation in Afghanistan underlined the consequences of state failure anywhere in the world (Welsh, 2002: 518).

#### FIXING THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS NOT THE ANSWER-Weiss '04

[Thomas; Professor of Political Science at The Graduate Center of The City University of New York; "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

The logic of 'if it ain't broke, don't fix it' should find more resonance. Practical effectiveness should trump grumblings about representation, especially as humanitarian intervention would be even less likely with a reformed Council. This reality was present before what Charles Krauthammer called 'the unipolar moment' (Krauthammer, 1990/1991). As this moment is likely to last for some time, continued jostling about Charter reform is at best a distraction. As Robert Kagan writes, 'Hopes that a multipolar regime might emerge have faded since the 1990s. Almost everyone concedes today that U.S. power will be nearly impossible to match for decades' (Kagan, 2004: 71). If military intervention to protect human beings is desirable, the critical task is to engage the United States in multilateral efforts.

#### SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM IS WASTED TIME-Weiss '04

[Thomas; Professor of Political Science at The Graduate Center of The City University of New York; "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

Rather than wasting energy on Security Council reform, concerned diplomats, scholars, and activists should try to understand when Washington's instrumental multilateralism, and hence when the humanitarian impulse, kicks in. The roller coaster of humanitarian intervention in the 1990s suggests that US participation often is essential and helpful. Kosovo and Afghanistan demonstrated the superiority of both US firepower and collective action. Edward Luck notes: 'In the end, other states and international secretariats will largely determine whether US policy-makers and legislators find international bodies to be places where America's exceptional potential is welcomed and embraced or is resented and restrained' (Luck 2003: 48; see also Luck, 1999).

#### TURN: CRISES REQUIRE ACTION, NOT WORRY ABOUT MOTIVATION-Weiss '04

[Thomas; Professor of Political Science at The Graduate Center of The City University of New York; "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era"; Security Dialogue; June 2004]

Critics and skeptics of humanitarian intervention should be less preoccupied that military action will be taken too often for insufficient humanitarian reasons, but rather more concerned that it will be taken too rarely for the right ones. The case of Congo, where since 1998 an estimated 3.5 million people have died largely from the famine and disease accompanying armed conflict (IRC, 2003), demonstrates appallingly sparse responsibility to protect and plenty of inhumanitarian non-intervention. This fact represents as great a threat to international society and global justice as pre-emptive or preventive war.

## IDENTITY: MISUSED

### IDENTITY CONSTRUCTS ARE NOT USEFUL SOCIAL TOOLS-Von Busekist '04

[Astrid; Professor for Political Sciences at the Institut d' Etudes Politiques; "Uses and Misuses of the Concept of Identity"; Security Dialogue; March 2004]

IN THIS ARTICLE, I WILL ARGUE that the notion of identity is of no great help in the social sciences. It is rather a portmanteau term that does not possess the status of a concept and that distracts us from the 'identity factory' and the political effects of the 'identity project'. One must therefore reflect upon 'collective identities': How are they constituted? Who are the 'identity entrepreneurs'? What are the expectations behind and the political effects of the recourse to identity? What remains obscured when one refers, a bit precipitously, to identity (as if political enterprises somehow suddenly become intelligible in the light of this magic word)?

### LEGITIMACY OF IDENTITY RAISES MORE QUESTIONS THAN USEFUL ANSWERS-Von Busekist '04

[Astrid; Professor for Political Sciences at the Institut d' Etudes Politiques; "Uses and Misuses of the Concept of Identity"; Security Dialogue; March 2004]

The problem of legitimacy, whether domestic (the right to secession or constitutive autonomy) or international (recognition by the international community, acceptance by the UN) raises the following questions in terms of identity-based claims and the constitution of groups: I can fight against what I designate as the foreign oppressor of my identity, whether this foreignness be political, cultural, religious or linguistic, but what is the status of the oppressor (subjectively experienced as such) when he or she belongs to my community? Are we still in the domain of a conflict of identities? Or are we entering into the domain, much more vast and more complex, of the political, which must, at least to a certain degree, be abstracted from considerations of 'identity' or 'community' in order to retain the notion of the citizen as defined by the theory of democracy? Indeed, the very definitions of the citizen and political legitimacy engage the identity of individuals, if only through the socialization of political cultures. The 'proposition' of my identity must thus, to a certain degree, be consonant with my political culture and my conception of citizenship. Otherwise, I can only base the success of my claim upon a profound political upheaval.

#### LANGUAGES ARE NOT A MEASURE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY-Von Busekist '04

[Astrid; Professor for Political Sciences at the Institut d' Etudes Politiques; "Uses and Misuses of the Concept of Identity"; Security Dialogue; March 2004]

Languages are born and die. Some accede to the stage of print capitalism and grammatical codification. Others remain oral. Some die or fall into disuse. 'Linguistic unification' is not possible without the aid of scholars, clerks, intellectuals, grammarians, etc. Of course, it also requires a certain number of users all sufficiently convinced of the utility of the idiom in question and sharing a wish that it become the most widespread. The linguistic emancipations of the 19th century were born of this convergence: there is a (bilingual) elite that seeks to promote its language generally as the dominant idiom (against universal Latin and/or the dynastic language, the language of the ecclesiastical hierarchies), aided by scholars (editors of dictionaries, grammarians, litterateurs of all kinds), making use of the argument that political liberation will follow from linguistic recognition. Even the 'great languages' spread in this way. Take the example of the 'provinces' learning French. This process was started by the revolutionaries, who argued that (revolutionary) political praxis and linguistic practice (the national idiom) were one and the same thing (Busekist, 1997; Certeau, Julia & Revel, 2002). Entrepreneurs and institutions thus fill in for one another: the school is obviously the principal stimulant and the principal factory of linguistic identity (in the sense of identity and in the sense of equality).

#### IDENTITY BASED ON LANGUAGE IS A TOOL FOR ELITES-Von Busekist '04

[Astrid; Professor for Political Sciences at the Institut d' Etudes Politiques; "Uses and Misuses of the Concept of Identity"; Security Dialogue; March 2004]

One final remark must be made in relation to common identity that is supposedly shared and therefore egalitarian (the idea that there is neither choice over nor a free ride into the identity space of the *Gemeinschaft*, and even less so for the *Gesellschaft*, and thus that entry does not repose upon a free choice of belonging). If one considers the relation between political elites and the population, one can see how a language is appropriated and how members of the linguistic space are designated. It is the freedom of choice of language that is in question, as well as the concrete advantages (economic, symbolic) that the individual can expect from belonging to a linguistic community that is recognized as such or one on the way to being so. 'Identity' mobilization through the use of language and through belonging to a linguistic group is particularly difficult to appreciate since common practice is not enough to create alliances. The linguistic argument, a powerful tool, is more often an alibi that fails to successfully conceal the true aspirations of the political elites.

IDENTITY CONSTRUCTS STRIP PEOPLE OF THEIR AUTONOMY-Von Busekist '04  
[Astrid; Professor for Political Sciences at the Institut d' Etudes Politiques; "Uses and Misuses of the Concept of Identity"; Security Dialogue; March 2004]

The dream of identity via language thus seems to be a noble and legitimate fight, but perfectly illusory since it supposes a degree of closure of the spaces that fail to accommodate political reality. Identity does not only reside in language, and an insistence on language alone fails to take account of the social stratification that necessarily exists in each linguistic community. It also ignores the fact that the delimitation of spaces merely by linguistic criteria is a very dangerous enterprise in which each individual is required to constitute itself in the margins and in conjunction with the multiple identities and the liberty of identification of each and every other individual. Finally, the porous border of linguistic space teaches us nothing of the social or political relations that prevail at its heart. To belong to a linguistic and political community that oppresses my liberty or rather opens me up to the language of another linguistic space that does indeed respect it does not cause me to renounce my identity: rather, it wedds me to a conception of the political that is perhaps even more determinant for my identity, because it reposes upon a choice. With the aid of the traits of collective identity mentioned above, one manages to easily 'denaturalize' identity and to analyze the allegiances in a critical and dynamic manner.

SPACE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY VARY AND HAVE NO CONCRETE MEANING-Von Busekist '04  
[Astrid; Professor for Political Sciences at the Institut d' Etudes Politiques; "Uses and Misuses of the Concept of Identity"; Security Dialogue; March 2004]

What about space, borders and territory in the constitution of collective identities? Obviously, groups also possess geographical anchoring, which gives rise to what Claude Nicolet calls 'geographical patriotism' (Nicolet, 1982), though this generalization hides quite different realities. Individuals can be attached to a concrete territory (a certain latitude and a certain longitude), but also to representations of passed space, or space to come, such as ideas, representations or symbols of space. In the case of diasporas, for example, reference to the land of origin and the distinction between homeland and hostland vary according to context and can equally give rise to both 'long-distance nationalism' and a strong cohesion of the diasporic community, since individuals are fully capable of not identifying with their group in exile, precisely because they are unwilling to perceive themselves as exiles. Moreover, the delimitation between space in which the citizen concretely moves varies considerably. Contrary to linguistic space, the collective constraint is patent here: as a member of any given community, country or federal state, I am subject to its norms.

TERRITORY CANNOT CREATE A MEANINGFUL IDENTITY-Von Busekist '04  
[Astrid; Professor for Political Sciences at the Institut d' Etudes Politiques; "Uses and Misuses of the Concept of Identity"; Security Dialogue; March 2004]

From the point of view of collective identity, the perception of territory, which is part of the classical repertory of the identity project, is changing and dynamic. The relationship between Frenchmen and Germans in Alsace Lorraine is no longer the same as it was immediately following 1870. As a construction, identity depends upon narrative, mythology, celebration and religious investment in the territory, as well as the cultural tradition associated with its representation. The border areas are often vested by several groups (the famous limitrophic towns in Belgium and Switzerland), as well as certain other particular spaces possess a sacrality whose administration is claimed by competing groups. Territory is most often a central motif in 'identity' mobilization, but only so far as it gives a political cover to a so-called cultural entity.

## REALISM FLAWED

### REALIST THINKING HAS BEEN FROZEN BY NEOREALIST THEORY-Molloy '03

[Sean; Graduate Student at the Centre for European Studies, Department of Government and Society, University of Limerick; "Realism: A Problematic Paradigm"; Security Dialogue; March 2003]

The vice-like grip of pseudo-structuralism – a theoretical approach that employs the language of structuralism without applying its concepts thoroughly, but rather according to expediency – has had the effect of squeezing realist discourse into suspended animation. This conceptual squeeze has resulted in realists such as Mearsheimer putting forward a redefinition of the realist tradition that possesses the language of classical realism but is still dependent upon neorealist categories for 'theoretical' validation, thus rendering the cutting edge of realism effectively blunt. This can be seen in his reduction of realism to a tripartite definition of a type that has become standard within realist thought, at least in the USA:

First, realists, like liberals, treat states as the principal actors in world politics. . . .  
Second, realists believe that the behavior of great powers is influenced mainly by their external environment, not by their internal characteristics. The structure of the international system, which all states must deal with, largely shapes their foreign policies.  
. . . Third, realists hold that calculations about power dominate states' thinking and that states compete for power among themselves. (Mearsheimer, 2001: 17–18)

This quotation illustrates the extent to which neorealist concerns have become embedded in realist thought, leading to the freezing of the realist tradition.

### REALISM IS CONCEPTUALLY FROZEN-Molloy '03

[Sean; Graduate Student at the Centre for European Studies, Department of Government and Society, University of Limerick; "Realism: A Problematic Paradigm"; Security Dialogue; March 2003]

Where Waltz is keen to stress the separation of theory and reality, Mearsheimer is anxious to build a 'sound' theory of political reality. Mearsheimer's approach is illustrative, in that his 'theory' is based on 'bedrock assumptions' derived from rationalist approaches to IR. But the tyranny of structuralism, an epistemological position that has severe difficulty recognizing the validity of other approaches, runs deep: Mearsheimer declares that his 'offensive realism' (so called to differentiate it from Waltz's defensive realism) is a structural theory of international politics that departs from defensive realism only in respect to their attitudes to power, offensive realism being more concerned with the extension of power than defensive realism, the primary concern of which is the preservation of power. The foundations of Mearsheimer's and Waltz's theories therefore remain the same: they are essentially rooted in a theory of politics as a structuralist enterprise. Rationalism and structuralism, then, are the two grand shibboleths of the contemporary realist enterprise. Rationalism as the epistemological method and structuralism as the ontological principle dictate the modern realist agenda. Realism therefore remains conceptually stuck in the period 1979–86, the period of the first flowering of neo- or structural realism.

### REALISM LACKS A SCIENTIFIC BASIS-Molloy '03

[Sean; Graduate Student at the Centre for European Studies, Department of Government and Society, University of Limerick; "Realism: A Problematic Paradigm"; Security Dialogue; March 2003]

One of the most important attempts to critique realism from a scientific perspective is Robert Keohane's 'Theory of World Politics' (1986). According to Keohane, although invaluable as a sophisticated framework of questions and initial hypotheses, 'realism does not provide a satisfactory theory of world politics, if we require of an adequate theory that it provide a set of plausible and testable answers to questions about state behaviour under specified conditions' (1986: 159). He then outlines three (familiar) 'fundamental assumptions' of realism: state-centrism; that states are rational actors; and that power is the aim of states (Keohane, 1986: 164–165). For Keohane, realism lacks an adequate basis in scientific terms, its vagueness and ambivalence leading to a lack of clarity that is unacceptable according to his Lakatosian definition of theoretical purity.

### REALISM IS UNSCIENTIFIC-Molloy '03

[Sean; Graduate Student at the Centre for European Studies, Department of Government and Society, University of Limerick; "Realism: A Problematic Paradigm"; Security Dialogue; March 2003]

John A. Vasquez is the most strident 'scientific' critic of realism in IR. His criticism is based upon the 'unscientific' nature of much realist IR theory. Vasquez's system of appraisal, like Waltz's neorealism, is based upon the philosophy of science, with the influence of Kuhn and Lakatos central to his project of determining the adequacy of realism in IR. Throughout *In Search of Theory*, Vasquez and his co-author maintain that their propositions were developed with an eye to the principles of falsifiability, a concern for measurement and a belief in parsimony (Mansbach & Vasquez, 1981: xv).

### REALIST THINKING CANNOT CREATE MEANINGFUL KNOWLEDGE-Molloy '03

[Sean; Graduate Student at the Centre for European Studies, Department of Government and Society, University of Limerick; "Realism: A Problematic Paradigm"; Security Dialogue; March 2003]

In evaluating realism, Vasquez makes 'the ability to produce knowledge' the ultimate criterion for judging a theory's truth or utility. This ability to produce knowledge is dependent upon the 'empirical content of its theories, that is, the number of theories that have failed to be falsified' (Vasquez, 1998:122). The failure of realism lies in its inability to provide a body of empirically sound theory from which IR can develop as a true science, one that conforms to a model of scientific development, whether that be under a Kuhnian or Lakatosian scheme. Realism, according to Vasquez, is operating as Kuhnian normal science; in Lakatosian terms, it is a degenerating rather than a progressive paradigm, the proof of which is found in its continual emendation in the face of challenges, which Vasquez terms a degenerating tendency. A progressive paradigm, according to Vasquez, is not emended in response to challenges to its world-view: such continual correction would cause both inconsistency and a lack of clarity (Vasquez, 1998: 286; Waltz, 1997; Walt, 1997).

REALISM HAS BEEN CO-OPTED BY NEOREALIST THINKING-Molloy '03  
[Sean; Graduate Student at the Centre for European Studies, Department of  
Government and Society, University of Limerick; "Realism: A Problematic Paradigm"; Security  
Dialogue; March 2003]

According to Legro & Moravcsik, the core assumptions within the realist paradigm are:

- the nature of the actors: rational, unitary political units in anarchy;
- the nature of state preferences: fixed and uniformly conflictual goals; and
- international structure: the primacy of material capabilities. (1999: 8–14)

Of these, the most important in terms of the cohesion of the realist paradigm is the recognition of the centrality of material power, which constitutes a 'fundamental reality'. The error of recent realist scholarship is its 'slide' into non-realist theory that is 'extraneous and contradictory to realism' (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999: 11–22). This slide beyond paradigmatic boundaries has led to realism being 'stretched, beyond all recognition or utility' (Legro & Moravcsik, 1999: 53). The most important aspect of Legro & Moravcsik's article is that, in an Orwellian stroke, the 'neo' that differentiated neorealism from previous realisms has been airbrushed from existence: the genealogy of realism is denied in favour of an antiseptic, hermetically sealed 'research program'.

REALISM IS STUCK IN A STATE-CENTRIC FLAWED PARADIGM THAT THREATENS US  
INTERESTS AND ABILITY TO COMPREHEND NEW THREAT OF TERRORISM-Molloy '03  
[Sean; Graduate Student at the Centre for European Studies, Department of  
Government and Society, University of Limerick; "Realism: A Problematic Paradigm"; Security  
Dialogue; March 2003]

The consequences of realism remaining stuck in an outmoded, state-centric and excessively simplified 'paradigm' such as neorealism is an active danger to the study of IR theory and the practice of international relations. The sociology of knowledge is such that the interpenetration of academic and professional policy circles within, for example, US diplomacy could lead to this simplistic and decontextualized theory determining the shape of US foreign policy. In a world in which the range of actors (at the state, substate, superstate and transnational levels) and security dilemmas (most importantly, transnational terrorism) is very different from the Cold War preoccupations of neorealism, policy derived from this perspective will be disastrously misconceived. Neorealism also has the negative effect of obscuring the value of a realist theory that originates in a family of philosophies of power in international relations and a mode of thought capable of producing intelligent commentary and policy prescriptions for a world in flux.

## SPACE WEAPONIZATION: CHINA IS A THREAT

### CHINA IS THE MOST LIKELY SPACE COMPETITOR-Garibaldi '04

[Gabrielle; nqa; "The Chinese Threat to Us Leadership in Space"; Security Dialogue; September 2004]

Of the potential 'peer competitors', China appears to be the most able to mount any sort of challenge to US primacy. Its space program is strongly supported by Chinese leaders, who wish to assert and maintain Chinese regional power, as well as to dispute the current unipolar world order. With the technical assistance of Russia and other former Soviet countries, the new nation is making such significant progress that it is now the focus of US concern.

### CHINA'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ABOUT SPACE ARE MISLEADING AND DANGEROUS-Garibaldi '04

[Gabrielle; nqa; "The Chinese Threat to Us Leadership in Space"; Security Dialogue; September 2004]

According to the Pentagon, China publicly opposes the militarization of space and is trying by diplomatic means to prevent or slow down the development by the USA of anti-satellite weapons and missile defence; however, in private, it considers the development of such weaponry to be inevitable if it wishes to maintain any pretence to multipolarity in the future, and is even going to the length of searching abroad for technical knowledge. For instance, Beijing is developing a new family of modular rockets to send heavy loads into space, with the aim of being able to put 25 tons into low earth orbit and 14 tons into geostationary orbit by 2007. Beijing has also begun to develop a smaller launch vehicle with a solid propellant, the Kaituozhe (Pioneer, KT or KTZ-1). The KT-1 is the first step towards the development of a series of small rockets that will be needed to launch a new generation of small satellites currently undergoing development. China is investing massively in the development of this type of mini-satellite, which could eventually be used offensively against other satellites.

### CHINA VIEWS SPACE AS CENTRAL TO ITS MILITARY FUTURE-Garibaldi '04

[Gabrielle; nqa; "The Chinese Threat to Us Leadership in Space"; Security Dialogue; September 2004]

China is also making substantial progress in manned space missions, with the first mission successfully completed on 17 October 2003, and it has long-term plans for its own space station and probably a reusable space shuttle. According to some US analysts, national prestige and pride are the main motivations behind this (very expensive) program, whose indigenous nature has been emphasized by China, though it could not have been achieved without Russian assistance. But, for the Chinese, the program is more than simply symbolic: it is a reaction to China's newfound awareness that space is important for the future of military operations (in relation to the US 'Revolution in Military Affairs') and is a domain from which China cannot remain excluded.

CHINESE SPACE PROGRAM IS REALLY A COVER FOR PLANS TO DEVELOP A NETWORK OF MILITARY SATELLITES-Garibaldi '04

[Gabrielle; nqa; "The Chinese Threat to Us Leadership in Space"; Security Dialogue; September 2004]

For some analysts, the Shenzhou, and the rest of China's space program, is intrinsically tied to Chinese efforts to modernize its military forces and to catch up with the USA's space assets. According to Michael Stokes, aerospace analyst at the Department of Defense, 'the Chinese human space flight program is part and parcel of the nation's broader ambitions in space that have very clear implications for U.S. national security 10 to 20 years in the future'. Stokes declared that China has paid great attention to the strategic role played by space assets in US military actions in the post-Cold War period (from the 1991 Gulf War to the recent war against Iraq). And he commented that he was personally worried less about China's attempt to catch up with the 'human space flight club' (the launch of Shenzhou 5 had not then occurred) than about its efforts 'to develop a robust network of military satellites of its own, while at the same time researching ways to take out the other's satellites in the event of a conflict'.

## SUDAN: RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

### SUDAN MEETS THE MOST STRINGENT TEST FOR INTERVENTION-Williams and Bellamy '05

[Paul, University of Birmingham, and Alex, University of Queensland; "The Responsibility To Protect and the Crisis in Darfur"; Security Dialogue; March 2005]

The parallels between this conception of sovereignty and the views put forward in the Security Council by the Philippines and the UK in relation to Darfur are striking. During the first half of 2004, the situation in Darfur was repeatedly described as representing a 'supreme humanitarian emergency', that is, a situation where 'the only hope of saving lives depends on outsiders coming to the rescue' (Wheeler, 2000: 34). According to the ICISS, there are two threshold criteria – 'large scale loss of life' and 'large scale ethnic cleansing' – that must be met before the 'responsibility to protect' can be invoked to override state sovereignty (ICISS, 2001: 14). Since there can be little doubt that these threshold conditions were met in the Darfur case, armed intervention to halt human suffering would have been legitimate (a view shared by Gberie, 2004: 8).

### DARFUR REPRESENTS A SUPREME HUMANITARIAN CRISIS-Williams and Bellamy '05

[Paul, University of Birmingham, and Alex, University of Queensland; "The Responsibility To Protect and the Crisis in Darfur"; Security Dialogue; March 2005]

In our opinion, the crisis in Darfur represented a supreme humanitarian emergency. It therefore provides an important test case of international society's commitment to an emerging norm of humanitarian intervention and the ideas set out in The Responsibility to Protect report. The current war in Darfur began in earnest in February 2003, when first Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and then Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) forces attacked government military installations in frustration at decades of political marginalization and economic neglect.<sup>2</sup> The rebels initially appeared to take the government by surprise and enjoyed some successes, notably the destruction of half a dozen military aircraft and the capture of an air force general at El Fasher Airport in April 2003 (de Waal, 2004b; Power, 2004). The government responded to the insurgency by deploying some of its own troops (notably the air force), but more significantly by arming and supporting the janjaweed militias (an umbrella term popularly encompassing outlaws/ bandits, Arab tribal militias and the Popular Defence Forces). The janjaweed subsequently engaged in killings, abductions, forced expulsions, systematic sexual violence, and deliberate destruction of crops, livestock and important cultural and religious sites.

### US IS HIDING BEHIND IDEA THAT AFRICA SHOULD SOLVE-Williams and Bellamy '05

[Paul, University of Birmingham, and Alex, University of Queensland; "The Responsibility To Protect and the Crisis in Darfur"; Security Dialogue; March 2005]

The reluctance of the UN, the EU and the USA to threaten military intervention in Darfur meant that the AU assumed centre stage in the international response. However, despite clear evidence of government complicity in attacks upon civilians, like the West, the AU has refused to act without the consent of the Sudanese government. Darfur's crisis presented the AU with a genuine opportunity to find an African solution to this African problem through the invoking of Article 4(h) of its new charter, which permits collective intervention in 'grave circumstances', namely, when there is evidence of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. However, in this case, the slogan of 'African solutions to African problems' provided a convenient façade behind which Western powers could wash their hands of committing their own soldiers to Darfur.

#### PRACTICAL STEPS TO SOLVE-Williams and Bellamy '05

[Paul, University of Birmingham, and Alex, University of Queensland; "The Responsibility To Protect and the Crisis in Darfur"; Security Dialogue; March 2005]

Given our argument that a humanitarian intervention would have been legitimate in Darfur's case, what should have been done in practical terms? In our opinion, would-be interveners would have faced a spectrum of options along the following lines:

1. Stop further deaths from slaughter, disease and hunger by providing troops to (a) ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance to the various camps for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Darfur; (b) protect the camps from the various militias; and (c) set up a no-fly zone and provide aerial reconnaissance.
2. Carry out (1), but also provide troops to help police a ceasefire agreement while talks continue between the government and rebels.
3. Carry out (1) and (2), and ensure the resettlement of IDPs and refugees.
4. Carry out (1), (2) and (3), and provide troops to help manage the transition period after the government/janjaweed and SLA/JEM conclude a political agreement.

#### 5,000 TROOPS WOULD BE ENOUGH-Williams and Bellamy '05

[Paul, University of Birmingham, and Alex, University of Queensland; "The Responsibility To Protect and the Crisis in Darfur"; Security Dialogue; March 2005]

Of course, there are no quick fixes for Darfur's crisis, but according to most expert assessments the arrival of a relatively small number (circa 5,000) of foreign soldiers pursuing Option 1, above, could have made a substantial difference to the plight of the local population.<sup>12</sup> Even if an intervention stopped at Option 1, this could have provided the political breathing space for conflict resolution to begin in earnest, perhaps in tandem with implementation of the Naivasha agreement (see below).

## SUDAN: EXCESSIVE PRESSURE ON DARFUR BAD

EXCESSIVE PRESSURE COULD COLLAPSE SOUTHERN PEACE PROCESS-Williams and Bellamy '05

[Paul, University of Birmingham, and Alex, University of Queensland; "The Responsibility To Protect and the Crisis in Darfur"; Security Dialogue; March 2005]

The third and arguably pivotal factor is that Western leaders also voiced prudential concerns about the potential impact an intervention in Darfur might have on Sudan's other civil wars, especially the government-SPLM/A conflict. As US Secretary of State Colin Powell put it, 'There is a concern that we don't want to put so much on the Sudanese government, that causes internal problems that might make the situation worse. . . . At the same time, everybody recognizes that pressure is needed or else we would not get any action at all' (Hoge, 2004). After investing considerable diplomatic capital in pushing the Machakos/Naivasha process forward, the troika and the other participants in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) process were keen to see the agreement implemented. These powers saw the Naivasha agreement as potentially ending Africa's longest running civil war and providing a framework within which the grievances of other regions within Sudan could be addressed. Within this framework, Darfur and Sudan's other conflict-ridden regions would have to be integrated into the overall settlement during the envisaged transitional period. In the light of these developments, Darfur's crisis was considered secondary to securing an agreement between the government and the SPLM/A, as well as on the country's other contested regions, such as Abyei, the Nuba Mountains and the southern Blue Nile. As one commentator put it in early 2004, 'no one is willing to compromise the current prospects of ending Africa's longest war' (Mans, 2004: 293; see also Power, 2004). Western states were concerned that an intervention in Darfur could trigger a domino effect wherein other Sudanese groups, disgruntled at their marginalization from the Machakos/ Naivasha process – such as the Beja of eastern Sudan – would pursue the SLA/JEM route of armed insurgency just as the process was starting to make real progress.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SOUTHERN PEACE PROCESS OFFERS BEST HOPE FOR DARFUR-Williams and Bellamy '05

[Paul, University of Birmingham, and Alex, University of Queensland; "The Responsibility To Protect and the Crisis in Darfur"; Security Dialogue; March 2005]

The fact that the SLA had publicly announced a merger with the eastern-based Beja Congress only served to heighten such concerns (Mans, 2004: 292). For all its faults, some commentators have argued that implementing the Naivasha agreement remains the best chance of securing a political resolution of Darfur's crisis. Alex de Waal (2004a), for instance, argued that bringing the SPLA leader John Garang to Khartoum as vice president as envisaged in the Naivasha agreement would help stop the war in Darfur, because Garang's desire to represent all of Sudan's non-Arab peoples, including Darfurians, would make it politically impossible for him to endorse a war there. Indeed, Garang has indicated he would assist in the search for peace in Darfur (see Deng, 2004: para 33).

INTERVENTION WOULD EMBOLDEN REBELS AND REDUCE THE CHANCE OF  
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE-Williams and Bellamy '05

[Paul, University of Birmingham, and Alex, University of Queensland; "The Responsibility To  
Protect and the Crisis in Darfur"; Security Dialogue; March 2005]

The fear that intervention would jeopardize the Machakos/Naivasha process has been consistently invoked by those opposed to such a course of action. Hugo Slim (2004: 822), for instance, argued that a policy of linking Sudan's two major conflicts 'could not be done too forcefully' if it risked the downfall of President Bashir, which, in turn, would in all likelihood provoke the 'unravelling' of Sudan. Although Slim admitted that a 'linkage' strategy might have been effective had it been attempted at the outset of the Darfur crisis, others have gone further. Ramesh Thakur (2004: 63), for example, argued that talk of Western intervention would, in all probability, embolden the rebels in Darfur and elsewhere in Sudan, worsen conditions, and reduce the chances of a comprehensive and sustainable peace settlement.

MILITARY INTERVENTION WOULD COMPLICATE THE PEACE PROCESS AND PUSH  
SUDAN INTO MULTIPLE, CATASTROPHIC CONFLICTS-Williams and Bellamy '05

[Paul, University of Birmingham, and Alex, University of Queensland; "The Responsibility To  
Protect and the Crisis in Darfur"; Security Dialogue; March 2005]

Similarly, in September 2004, Francis Deng (2004: paras 36–37), the UN Secretary- General's Special Representative on internally displaced persons, argued that 'far from alleviating the suffering of the people of Darfur', military intervention would be likely to 'complicate and aggravate the situation', because it would provoke resistance that would add 'another layer of conflict' and would jeopardize the government's cooperation on the Machakos/Naivasha process. Deng concluded that 'international intervention in Darfur . . . Would push the country into an unknown future of multiple conflicts, with catastrophic consequences'. His preferred solution was for 'the international community to support the AU to meet this challenge'.

## TOPICALITY: PEACEBUILDING DISTINCT FROM PEACEKEEPING

PEACEBUILDING IS DISTINCT FROM PEACEKEEPING, BECAUSE IT IS ACTIONS TAKEN AFTER THE END OF CONFLICT-Talentino '02

[Andrea; Department of Political Science, Tulane; "Intervention as Nation-Building: Illusion or Possibility?" Security Dialogue; March 2002]

Former United Nations (UN) secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali first coined the term peacebuilding in *An Agenda for Peace* in 1992. Arguing that peacekeeping was ineffective if it did not 'consolidate peace', Boutros-Ghali advocated peacebuilding, measures taken after conflict had ended to rebuild or reform government institutions and processes. That perspective has now been extended to describe multidimensional operations addressing economic and social institutions as well, in what Thomas Franck calls the 'full service approach'.

PEACEBUILDING IS CEASEFIRE ENFORCEMENT, PEACE ENFORCEMENT, DEMOCRACY, JUSTICE, AND EQUITY ISSUES-Talentino '02

[Andrea; Department of Political Science, Tulane; "Intervention as Nation-Building: Illusion or Possibility?" Security Dialogue; March 2002]

Definitions vary, but Elizabeth Cousens emphasizes five objectives inherent in peacebuilding: self-enforcing ceasefire; self-enforcing peace; democracy; justice; and equity. Cousens advocates making the second the highest priority, although to some extent it implies partial achievement of the others. The intended target is not just elites but the masses, a point made by Raymond Taras and Rajat Ganguly. They describe peacebuilding as the attempt to 'foster mutual understanding between adversaries', societal reconstruction, and socio-economic development.<sup>6</sup> John Paul Lederach views it as a continuous, dynamic process and suggests that some more far-reaching reforms may take 20 years for full consolidation.